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1INTRODUCTION
This study has been made at a time when the
world is witnessing many changes in its monetary
systems and the gold standard as such has been
abandoned by most nations. However, gold still
predominates in its influence despite the tempo-
rary breakdown of individual gold standard sys-
tems
.
No effort has been made to make this a high-
ly mathematical discussion but the subject has
been treated as a problem of reasoning and logic
based on history and the recent experience of na-
tions with monetary controls.

2MONETARY CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Chapter I
HISTORY OF CURRENCY
In the simple economy of primitive people,
the exchange of goods was effected by means of
barter. As the economic life of man became
more involved, some common denominator or meas-
uring stick of value was necessary in order to
determine the relative value of goods. This u-
sually took the form of some necessity of life
such as cattle (food) and furs (clothing).
The next step in the evolution of a medi-
um of exchange brought into use the precious
metals, when they were available in sufficient
quantities. These answered the need for a
measure of value and at the same time were high-
ly convenient to handle, so that they achieved
a value not only as a commodity but as a medium
of exchange.

3Gold and silver have been the principal
metals in such use. They are not easily de-
structible, have been available in sufficient
quantities for use as money and yet are not so
abundant as to lose their value. Any other
metal that fulfilled the above qualifications
could be used, but the fact that gold and sil-
ver have a high intrinsic value to all races
and have been used as money for so many cen-
turies adds to their general acceptability.
Many coins are in existence today that
were used by the ancient Mongolians and. Egyp-
tians centuries before the birth of Christ,
indicating that these people carried on ex-
tensive trade. The early Romans possessed a
metallic currency based on the precious met-
als which aided them in carrying on a large
foreign trade. * During the middle ages spe-
cie was scarce and Taussig# indicates that
prices were very low reflecting the scarcity
of the metal. Silver was the more common of
the metals and in very general use. At that
* Principles of Money & Banking (5rd Edition)
Page 4, R D Kilborne , Ph D
# Principles of Economics, Volume I, Page 253,
F W Taussig

4time there was considerable production of sil-
ver in Germany, Sweden, Bohemia and Spain but
very little production of gold.
The development of the North and South
American continents in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries added greatly to the world's
supply of precious metals. This increase was
principally in silver, as gold existed and was
produced in small quantities only.
The use of paper money on any considerable
scale began during the latter part of the seven-
teenth century. The first paper money was is-
sued by public or semi-public banks and found a
ready circulation, as it was representative pa-
per promising to pay in specie.. "By the eight-
eenth century, paper substitutes for metallic
money had become so familiar that the v/ay was
easy for the issue of inconvertible paper by
r
public authorities."-"- The American Congress dur-
ing the Revolution issued paper money in such
large quantities, that it became practically
* Principles of Economics, Volume I, Page 305,
F W Taussig

5worthless, as did France during the French
Revolution at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury. The Southern Confederacy resorted to
inconvertible paper to finance their war opera-
tions, issuing it in large quantities till it
became worthless. Other than this small sec-
tion of the United States, no important coun-
try during the nineteenth century went so far
to depreciate its currency that it became worth-
less .
About 1850 the production of precious met-
als was increased considerably due to the dis-
covery of rich gold deposits in Australia and
California.
The supply of gold available for monetary
purposes in Europe more than doubled in the dec-
ade 'from 1850 to 1860 because of the discover-
ies in Australia and California, and this had a
tremendous influence in changing the preference
for metallic money from silver to gold. In the
Western World silver was displaced to a large ex-

6tent by gold, and the silver flowed to the Ori-
ent where it has been largely lost to world
trade. Another tremendous increase in the pro-
duction of gold took place in the period from
1890 to 1910. During this period silver was
completely displaced for monetary use in the
Western countries, gold being the standard of
payment in all but the Orient. Silver's only
monetary use was as a subsidiary currency.
Since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, improved mining processes have made avail-
able large quantities of gold from low grade ore
that could not be profitably mined prior to that
time. At the present time production is charac-
terized by steadiness, which is increasing world
supply but slowly on a percentage basis, and new
discoveries have been irregular and of small con-
se juences
.

Chapter II
TYPES OF. CURRENCY
There are innumerable types and kinds of
currency both in metallic and paper forms. For
everyday transactions paper has largely sup-
planted metallic coins, other than the subsid-
iary coinage for small transactions which is
a part of the financial system of most civi-
lized countries. There are two principal
types of paper currency, namely, convertible
and inconvertible. Convertible paper, which
is redeemable in specie and backed 100% by
specie, is merely representative paper and
its use involves no intricate problem of vol-
ume, or control and regulation which charac-
terizes most other forms of paper money. It
need not be further discussed at this point
for its problems are those of the metal that it
represents and will be discussed in another
chapter.

8There is another form of paper money is-
sued by governments which Moulton refers to
as convertible fiduciary paper. This type of
paper is exchangeable for specie but is not
backed 100$ by the specie. With the use of
this currency there is possible a regulation
of the quantity that can be issued, and con-
trol of volume becomes a problem of paramount
importance.
There are several methods of controlling
the volume of this type of currency:
a. Specie reserve must be fixed per cent of
paper issued.
b. Fixed minimum quantity of gold as a re-
serve and paper variable.
c. Fixed volume of paper based on bonds, re-
mainder based on 100$ specie.
d. Paper based on real and personal wealth.
The above is partly based on methods outlined
by Moulton.*
* Financial Organization of Society, Page 99,
H G Moulton

9Paper money came into use on a consider-
able scale in the latter part of the seven-
teenth century. At first it waj issued by
banks and represented bona fide promises to
pay and thus found ready circulation. This
use of paper money paved the way for later
issues of paper money which Were not promises
to pay, namely, fiat money or inconvertible
paper. The use of paper money had become a
public habit and the way was open to public
authorities to take advantage of the public
acceptance of paper money and to issue fiat
money. A strong government could give support
to fiat money by laws, giving the money the sta-
tus of legal tender and by making it good pay-
ment of public debts. However, distrust of the
government issuing this money or dislike of
paper money on the part of the people, may
make its circulation slow and not acceptable
to the people. It is also affected by the vol-
ume in which it is issued. History shows that
when irredeemable paper is issued, the volume

is sure to increase and very- often to the point
that the paper becomes entirely worthless. This
measure is most often resorted to in times of
stress and scarcity of wealth as was the case
during the periods of the American Revolution
and the Civil War. Paper money tends to drive
out metallic money and especially when the pa-
per money is irredeemable. Writing of "overissue"
Professor Taussig states, "Prices are steadily
higher than they would be under a specie regime.
When room for the paper is no longer made by the
expulsion of specie, any added quantity causes a
permanently higher level of prices. All the con-
sequences of such a rise show themselves. Credi-
tors lose, debtors gain. Prices of commodities
rise faster than do ordinary wages, and faster
than those incomes which are called "fixed", be-
cause strongly affected by custom. Business men
make money. The rate of interest rises. An ex-
hileration is felt in the industrial world, pre-
cisely as when prices rise from added supply of
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specie. The exhileration lasts as long, and
only as long, as the process is kept up. It is
the result not of higher prices, but of rising
prices. When once the higher level is reached
all round.... the effect is like that of a drug;
when the stimulus no longer acts, a reaction
sets in. n* There are countless examples of the
overissue of paper (fiat) money, but only one
notable example of the use of fiat money with-
out serious depreciation. "The most notable is
that of France in the War of 1870-71. The notes
of the Bank of France (which were made virtually
government paper, not exchangeable for specie)
were issued in large amounts to aid the govern-
ment in its financial exigiences during and
after the great struggle. Yet the situation was
handled with such caution and skill that only a
slight specie premium appeared, lasting a short
time only. The possible gain from a resort
to paper was secured in this case without any
serious drawback, "# He later points out£ that
this money was made as a loan to the government
,
-^Principles of Economics Vol I, Page 309, F W Taussig
£ n n tt tt n v 515 ti
% » n » » ,T t! 356 "

and the government paid the bank interest on
it and was to resume specie payment on it at
a later date which it did. This made it prac-
tically representative paper as it was a prom-
ise to pay at a future date although the date
was not definitely stated.

Chapter III
THEORY OF MONEY
During periods of stress and strain in an
economic depression or during national crises
brought on by war and impoverishment, there is
a tendency to fall back on inflation of the na-
tional currency as a means of easing the strain.
During periods of depression such as the world
is experiencing at the present time, the tempta-
tion is present to inflate the currency in c '-der
to give a stimulus to business, for business
does enjoy a degree of prosperity during any pe-
riod of rising prices. But this is an artifi-
cial stimulant and if carried too far, will
give a reaction that is decidedly unpleasant
unless the business ills have been thoroughly
cured during the depression. During the pres-
ent depression there has been almost no resort
to inflation, although much pressure has been
brought to bear to bring it about. It is high-
ly probable that the greatest restraining influ-
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ence has been the recent experience of many
European powers, when during the depression
of 1921-24, they resorted to inflation, their
currencies becoming almost worthless. From
the close of the World War to July 1926 the
French circulation increased 70#, while the
German circulation increased 21,587,000,000$
during the first five years after the War,*
Similar inflation occurred in Belgium, Austria
and Poland.
This inflation caused a highly unstable
condition of industry once the stimulating af-
fect of the first rises in prices was passed.
Then followed the struggle to return to a
sound money basis. This they were all success-
ful in doing and it is unlikely that any of
these countries wish to experience similar
trials at the present time and their experience
is constantly before the eyes of the other coun-
tries as an object lesson. Inflation and at-
tendant money evils are laid at the door of the
---Principles of Money & Banking, Page 62,R D Kilborne
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growth of capitalism, or perhaps more accurately
industrialism, by many writers. Others attribute
it to war and the burden of debt that it brings.
The latter theory seems more logical and is sub-
stantiated by the history of the past seventy-
five years.
Inflation has the effect of aiding the deb-
tor groups who are able to ease their burdens by
paying their debts with a depreciated currency
that is easily availaole, while on the contrary
it deprives the investing class of a part of its
wealth due to a relatively fixed income on the
part of this class of people. Keynes writes
that "as a result of the war... and the monetary
policy which has accompanied and followed it,...
a large part of the real value of the possessions
of the investing class.. about \ of their real val-
ue in England, 7/8 in France, 11/12 in Italy and
virtually the whole in Germany, has been taken
away."* He reasons, and soundly, that in order
to draw savings into investments in the future,
it will be necessary to have a stable standard of
*Monetary Reform, Page 19, J M Keynes

value. Deflation is as a rule involuntary but
occasionally it has been accomplished deliber-
ately as a matter of policy, as in the case of
Great Britain when she resumed gold payments
and stabilized pound sterling at its old par
of £4.86. In this case the practical working
out of deflation has followed closely the lines
that it should from a theoretical point of view.
It protected the investing class which is pre-
dominant in England at the expense of the debtor
group, and it did not in any way stimulate busi-
ness although it did give a degree of stability.
This country is experiencing a period of
involuntary deflation with all its attendant dif-
ficulties, but in spite of the hardships it
brings, people as a whole are sold on the theory
of sound money as best in the long run. It is
no doubt acting as a purifier and adjuster of un-
sound conditions which were brought about by rap-
id expansion and easy prosperity, when people for-
got real issues and each one thought that he could

gamble for a living, as attested by the un-
precedented interest of the general public in
stock market speculation during the late bull
market.
The quantity theory of money in its sim-
plest terms rests on the belief that prices
vary in the same ratio as the quantity of mon-
ey, that is the doubling of the quantity of
money would double prices. Money in this con-
nection must include bank credit that serves
to effect a transfer of goods or complete a
contract. It is affected, however, by many
things such as the habits of people in regard
to the amount of pocket money that they carry
and the rapidity with which money is T: turned
over", the confidence of the public in the ul-
timate value of their currency and the extent
to which available credit is utilized. The
nearest approach to the heart of the proposi-
tions seems to be that the amount of money and
credit that actively circulates does affect
prices in a positive ratio.

The Theory of Purchasing Power Parity as
developed by professor Cassel rests on the be-
lief that the "rate of exchange between the
home currency and the foreign currency must
tend in equilibrium to be the ratio between
the purchasing powers of the foreign currency
in the foreign country and of the home cur-
rency at home."-"- This applies to inconvertible
currencies as the rate of exchange of gold cur-
rencies rests on the quantity of gold contained
in each unit of currency.
Foreign exchange in the case of inconvert-
ible currencies should be governed on the basis
of the purchasing ower parity, all other things
being equal. As stated in the case of curren-
cies based on gold, the foreign exchange ratio
should be determined by the quantity of gold con
tained in the respective units of currency. In
general it is true that the rate of exchange be-
comes more favorable to a country that is exper-
iencing declining prices, and less favorable to
^Monetary Reform, Page 96, J M Keynes
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a country going through a period of rising
prices in relation to other countries. The
rate of exchange is also subject to seasonal
variations, due to irregular volume of inter-
national trade at various times of the year.
Prior to the war these seasonal variations
were usually cared for by short-term credits
transferred from one center to another, and
this service could be rendered inexpensively
and with little risk when all currencies were
convertible into specie. Since the war, how-
ever, these short-term credits are not easily
obtainable and as a result large movements of
gold are necessary for the settlement of debts
that were formerly settled by means of credits
advanced for this purpose. The use of gold in
the settlement of debts is a costly and ineffi-
cient method and a stability of exchange would
tend to lessen the need of gold in the settle-
ment of international balances, v'hen means are
available in large and well organized centers
of finance, it will be possible to lessen the

risk of carrying on foreign trade by the use
of the forward market in exchange for making
a present contract for a future purchase of
foreign exchange, and in this way the uncer-
tainty of future transactions is lessened.
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Chapter IV
MONETARY SYSTEMS
Bimetallism -
Bimetallism as it is now known, or is advo-
cated, allows the free and unlimited coinage of
both gold and silver. If the coinage of either
metal is limited, as was the case in the United
States from 1679-1900, a country is not on a
true bimetallic standard but is on a n limping"
standard, so-called.* The two metals in this
system of coinage are interchangeable at a fix-
ed ratio set by law and both are full legal
tender.
Bimetallism was but a step in the evolution
of currencies. Although for many centuries past
both gold and silver have been freely coined, it
was not until the nineteenth century that the val-
ue of each metal was given a fixed ratio of value
to the other. This change was made as a matter
of convenience so that prices need not be quoted
in two currencies, that is, a gold price and a
•^-Principles of Money & Banking, Page 89,E D Kilborne
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silver price. The complete double standard
had a given weight of silver egual in payment
of debt to a fixed weight in gold. The ratio
was usually about sixteen parts of silver to
one of gold. Experience with this standard
proved that the cheaper metal drove out the
dearer one, for the reason that people hoarded
the more valuable metal and paid their bills
with the cheaper. This in a few words tells
exactly why the complete double standard can
never be successful. Many of its advocates
are self-seeking politicians who spread this
doctrine in order to obtain votes in sections
of the country where silver is mined.
However, silver as a subsidiary coinage -
can be an important adjunct to the general cur-
rency system as it is in this country. Its val-
ue in this case is equal to gold coinage for
all practical purposes in that it will be re-
deemed in full legal tender. Its value so given
is greater than its market value as a metal so
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that there is no tendency to melt it down or
hoard it. There is no free coinage of the
metal and it is purchased for this use by the
United States on the open market. The margin
of worth between the metallic value of the sub-
sidiary coinage and its face or legal tender
value is termed seigniorage and represents a
profit to the government issuing it.*
Moulton#
;;
:oints out that the United States
in the passage of its first coinage law in 1792
allowed for a definite ratio of silver to gold,
free coinage of both metals and full legal tend-
er for both. In practice silver, the cheaper
metal, was presented for coinage and gold was
used for bullion in international exchange or
hoarded so that we were practically on the sil-
ver standard.. Much gold also found its way to
France where the coinage ratio was more favor-
able. This condition was unchanged until 1854
when the ratio was changed to make gold over-
valued at the mint and as a result silver was
^-Banking Principles & Practice, Page 12, R B Westerfield
#Financial Organization, Page 74, H G Moulton

replaced. This continued until 1861 when
the United States entered the "greenback"
era of irredeemable paper currency. Resump-
tion of specie payments did not return until
1879 when we returned nominally to a bimetal-
lic standard but in practice the coinage of
silver was limited. The Gold Standard Act
was not passed until 1900, at which time gold
became the single standard of value.

Silver -
For many centuries the world was nominally
on a double standard of coinage, but actually
it was on the silver standard due to the opera-
tion of the so-called Gre shames Law. Silver be-
ing the more plentiful of the two precious met-
als was cheaper and therefore offered for coin-
age. Gold by comparison was scarce and conse-
quently the dearer of the metals.
Silver was relatively stable in value and
was a satisfactory medium of exchange, produc-
tion was steady and the available supply suffi-
cient for the world's monetary needs.
England was the first nation to abandon
silver and establish the single gold standard
in 1816. By this act she relegated silver to
the minor role of subsidiary coinage.
Silver owes its dethronement to the favor-
able experience of England with the single gold
standard and the subsequent discoveries of gold
which greatly increased the world's supply.
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During the middle of the nineteenth century
the leading countries of the world gradually
changed to the single gold standard. As gold
displaced silver the latter metal flowed into
the Orient where it has since held sway. Any
current discussion of the silver standard would
necessitate an intensive study of Far Eastern
monetary conditions which has not been attempted.
It is agreed, however, that the present extremely
low price of silver on world markets is a serious
threat to the development of the Orient and to its
present prosperity. A raising of silver prices
would be a large factor in bringing back this sec-
tion as -a world market. Nevertheless, it does not
seem probable that with the tremendous increase in
silver production during the twentieth century
that the price of silver will rise during the pres-
ent generation.
The price of silver declined from "a high of
60.6 cents per fine ounce in 1928 to 85.72 cents
in February 1931, a new low price for all time."*
This puts India, China, and Mexico who is on a
^Principles of Money & Banking, Page 39, R D Kilborne
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modified silver "basis, at a disadvantage when
engaging in trade with the remainder of the
countries. It takes more silver dollars to
purchase goods abroad than formerly, and the
payment of debts to gold standard countries,
or countries whose measure of value is gold,
becomes irksome.
The foreign exchange rates of these sil-
ver standard countries fluctuates in about the
same ratio as the value of silver as a metal
when quoted in terms of gold standard curren-
cies.
#
The only apparent solution is the abandon-
ment of silver for monetary purposes in the
Orient and the adoption of some form of the
gold standard in order to raise their purchas-
ing power. Some advocate the remonetization
of silver, or even bimetallism, but the increased
use of silver which could be brought about
through these various plans would have little
^Principles of Money & Banking, Page 4£,R D Kilborne
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effect in raising the value of silver in rela-
tion to gold. The production of newly mined
silver increased from "173,000, GuO ounces in
1920 to 261,000,000 ounces in 1930."*
^Principles of Money & Banking, Page 40, R D Kilborne

Gold -
The use of gold for monetary purposes as
already stated is almost as old as recorded
history but until the nineteenth century it
occupied a comparatively minor position owing
to the greater availability of silver.
The gold standard in its present form
was first adopted by Great Britain in 1816,
but it was not until the discovery of rich
gold deposits after 1840 that the available
supply of this metal was sufficient to satis-
fy monetary requirements of the Western TorId.
In the decade from 1851-1860, the average
yearly production of gold was four times great-
er than that decade immediately preceding it
and ten times greater than the decade from
1831-1840 only twenty years earlier. As gold
became more plentiful, it rapidly assumed
monetary leadership which it still holds de-
spite the fact that the largest part of the
world has abandoned redemption of gold. How-

ever, the v/orth of national currencies is
still largely judged by the wealth of the
national gold stock. The nations that have
abandoned the gold standard are scrambling
madly in the money markets for gold in ef-
forts to build up their gold stocks. This
fact would surely seem consistent with the
belief that these nations will return to the
gold standard whenever they find that they
have sufficient reserves to insure redemption
of their currency in gold.
The gold standard as it existed prior to
the World War was characterized by the free
and unlimited coinage of gold, the redemption
of currency on demand and a sole legal tender
status. The operation of these rules of the
game, so-called, was unhampered by legal re-
strictions and this period was characterized
by a relative stability of prices.
The gold standard of the post-war period
has been an entirely different standard than

that maintained prior to the War. Specie in
circulation has become a rarity, it having be-
come the custom of the banks to hold all the
gold possible in reserve. Some nations have
redeemed their currencies in bullion only
(France) as a means of keeping gold coinage
from circulating . The bullion is suitable
for settlement of international balances but
hardly practical for domestic transactions.
This has had the effect of concentrating gold
in vaults of central banks and accustoming
people to the use of paper money. The gold
bullion standard is being seriously consider-
ed for adoption in the United States to re-
place the gold specie standard.
By the Gold Standard Act of 1900 the
United States adopted the single gold standard
which has endured until the present time with
the exception of a few "gold holidays". At
this time a gold fund was established to guar-
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antee redemption of our greenback currency.
There followed a period of prosperity and
large profits. In 1S07 there was a monetary
crisis due to faulty control of the bank-
note issue. In many states legal bank holi-
days were declared and most banks suspended
specie payment. This led to plans for a
central bank. At the same time the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act of 180S was passed to provide
for an emergency issue of bank notes to en-
able the banks to liquidate their deposits.
This Act was extended to 1914. In that year
the banking system was subject to another fi-
nancial strain and this emergency currency
probably prevented a panic.-"- This currency
was subject to a tax that brought its rapid
contraction when it was no longer needed. In
the latter part of 1914 the Federal Reserve
System was functioning and with it came the
issue of the Federal Reserve notes that have
since become the most important form of bank
notes in circulation as indicated by the fol-
*Principles of Money & Banking, Page 164, R D Kilborne
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lowing chart:*
VOLUME OF FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE CIR-
CULATION IN RELATION TO TOTAL
MONEY IN CIRCULATION
June 30. Federal
Reserve
Notes
1981 ! $2,599,598
1922 2,138,715
1923 2,254,660
1924 1,843,106
1925 1,636,108
1926 1,679,407
1927 1,702,845
1928 1,626,453
1929 1,692,721
1930 1,402,066
Total
Money in
Circulation
4
4
110,993
,463
,823
4,849
4,815
4,885
4,851
4,796
4,746
4,521
,172
275
,307
,208
,266
,322
,626
,297
,988
These figures show that in the decade 1920-
1930 the value of Federal Reserve notes in
circulation constituted from one third to one
half of all the currency in circulation in-
cluding actual gold specie and subsidiary
coins
.
The gold holdings of the United States
increased tremendously during the period of
^-Principles of Banking & Finance, Page 297, G W Edwards

34
the World "war. "The amount of our gold hold-
ings increased by about b0% during 1915, 1916
and 1917. In spite of our huge gold resources
which amounted to about one third of the world's
monetary supply,in 1917 the .Secretary of the
Treasury declared an embargo on gold which com-
bined with an unwillingness to redeem our cur-
rency in gold constituted a temporary departure
from the gold standard. The foreign exchange
value of our currency was thereby lowered. This
abandonment of the gold standard was against
the wishes of the Federal Reserve Board but was
no doubt considered a necessary evil of the war
period. Since the War we have maintained the
integrity of the gold standard until the crisis
of 1955 which is discussed in the chapter en-
titled Recent Events.
-^Principles of Money & Banking, Page 167, R D Kilborne
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The Gold Exchange Standard -
One of the outstanding characteristics
of monetary history since the War has been
the widespread adoption of the gold exchange
standard by countries not possessing suffi-
cient gold or wealth to maintain an independ-
ent gold standard system. It is to be regret-
ted that this system has suffered a severe set-
back because of the unsettled economic condi-
tions of the past two years.
The essentials of this system have been
concisely outlined by Kilborne. "The condi-
tions necessary for the gold exchange standard
are therefore, first, a cessation of the free
coinage of silver; second, the establishment of
a gold reserve at home or abroad or both, with
the sale of drafts on these gold reserves at a
rate as low as the cost of exporting or import-
ing the gold; and finally, the retirement or ex-
pansion of the native currency when drafts are
sold or cashed."
^-Principles of Money & Banking, Page 48, R D Kilborne
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This is a highly efficient and economic
system that is an aid to the weaker nations
in maintaining a stable domestic currency,
and at the same time creates a stable for-
eign exchange with other gold standard or gold
exchange standard nations. Under this system
a nation can maintain a paper or silver stand-
ard -without undergoing the economic readjust-
ments that would be necessary with a change
to the true gold standard, assuming that a
conversion were possible. It also economizes
existing monetary gold stocks, for a small
gold fund plus foreign exchange or actual cur-
rency of gold standard countries can be set up
to insure the successful operation of the plan.
Prices in nations operating with a gold exchange
standard show a uniformity parelleling prices in
gold standard countries which tends to stabilize
the world price level.
The chief disadvantage of this gold exchange
standard lies in the strain on the great finan-
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cial centers of the world during periods of
unsettled financial conditions. New York City
and London were the centers upon which the
world depended for maintenance of this system.
It was in these two cities that the gold bal-
ances of the nations on the gold exchange
standard were lodged. The international bank-
ing crisis of 1331 brought withdrawals of these
balances and this was a contributary cause to
the abandonment of the gold standard by Great
Britain and brought the United States close to
a similar condition. The liability of London,
due to gold balances maintained there by other
nations and sterling bills held by these same
nations, was £54,000,000 pounds in March 1931,
and similar factors v/ere responsible for a
large liability on the part of New York City
estimated at $2,000,000,000 in 1930.*
The suspension of gold payments by Great
Britain in 1931 and by the United States in 1933
*Principles of Money & Banking, Pa^e 54, R D Kilborne

has eliminated the gold exchange standard
for the present taut it is hoped that with
the return of "normal" conditions the stand-
ard will once more take its place as a
counterpart of the true gold standard system.
An international central bank as outlined in
the Conclusions should eliminate the chief
disadvantage of this system.
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Paper Standard and Greenbacks -
Paper standards of currency in a strict
sense are those that are inconvertible. They
constitute issues of what is generally termed
fiat money. However, paper standards in prac-
tice may be of a higher order than would be
implied from the use of the term fiat money.
There are several reasons for this. Na-
tions who are now on a paper (inconvertible)
standard are able to maintain their currencies
with a relatively stable value because of the
fact that gold is still held by their central
banks and they are purchasing more gold when-
ever possible. Gold then is still a measure
of value for their currencies although they
are not redeemable at present. Stability of
currencies is also maintained by the fact that
much of the currency is based on forms of wealth
other than gold, such as commercial paper, govern-
ment bonds or similar assets. There is also the
possibility that s ecie payments will be resumed

within a reasonable length of time. For the
reasons outlined, paper standard currency at
the present tine is functioning in a reasonably
efficient manner with only minor fluctuations
in value. There is no doubt that this degree
of stability is due to value behind the curren-
cy including gold stocks in reserve and hope of
ultimate redemption.
The paper currency as discussed above is
not to be confused with purely printing press
money that is issued with no hope of ultimate
redemption as was true in Germany ten years ago.
This debacle is too recent to be disregarded by
the nations and to date has been a prime factor
in preventing similar monetary experience dur-
ing the present degression.
There is, however, the ever present danger
to nations whose currency is not anchored to
gold, that mounting governmental deficits will
ultimately bring issues of so-called printing

press money. Cooperation among the nations
to bring about an early return of the gold
standard is the only certain way of avoiding
violent inflation in the next few years.
In the monetary history of the United
States one of the most interesting periods
was from 186S-1879 when the nation was on an
irredeemable .paper standard. In the early
period of the Civil War the country was in a
poor financial condition. The government was
facing a deficit, an effort to float a large
loan had failed and the banks had suspended
specie payments. Two methods of financing
were open to the government in the form of
increased taxes or issuing of irredeemable
currency. The latter course was chosen and
in 1868, £150,000,000 of irredeemable paper
money was issued. This was followed by other
issues of paper money which brought inflation
in the form of higher prices, increased cost
of gold for international trade and increased
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cost of financing the war. Professor V1 , C
Mitchell estimates that the issuance of green-
backs in the place of metallic or redeemable
currency increased the cost of the war approxi-
mately one half billion dollar s.-"-
These greenbacks drove the hard money
from circulation and gold was traded as a com-
modity for use in foreign trade. In July 1664
gold cost $285.00 in greenbacks which was the
highest price reached ,# reflecting a deprecia-
tion of approximately one third in the gold
value of the dollar.
This gold value of the greenbacks depended
on several factors such as "the number of notes
outstanding, the war news, the condition of the
Treasury, the ability of the government to bor-
row and changes in the officials of the Treasury
Department.
Commodity prices rose rapidly after 1862
reflecting the increase in the currency issue and
^Principles of Money & Banking, Page 174,R D Kilborne
# TT T! tt tt it n 171, "
II TT TT TT TT TT 171, V
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instability of paper currency. The index of
wholesale prices rose from 103 in 1862 to 185
in 1865* which year marked the end of the
Civil War. Prices tended to taper off from
1865 to 1879 when specie payments were re-
sumed .
After 1865 an effort was made to contract
the currency but it was abandoned in 1868.# In
this period of contraction, prices did slowly
fall and conversely they rose slightly after
1868 when efforts to contract the currency were
abandoned. However, in 1870 falling prices set
in again and this tendency continued for the
balance of this paper standard period.
In 1875 Congress passed a Resumption Act
which set January 1, 1879, as the da oe i or re-
sumption of specie payments. In anticipation
of this the gold reserve was gradually in-
creased until 1879 when 1.5,000,000 in gold
was available as against a greenback circula-
tion of $546,681,016.
*Principles of Money & Banking, Page 171,11 D Kilborne
#Banking Principles & Practice, Page 49, R B Westerfield

This issue of greenbacks is still in cir
culation and a gold reser.ve of $150,000,000
is maintained for its redemption.
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Chapter V
PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENTS
In the last half of the nineteenth century
and up to the period of the World War the world
was undergoing a tremendous growth of trade and
industrialism. Is it coincidence that this
growth paralleled the development of the single
gold standard? Most economists agree that this
expansion, particularly on an international
scale, would not have been possible without a
common standard of value such as furnished by
the gold standard. One proof of the tremendous
influence that such a standard of value exerts,
is the almost complete stoppage of foreign
trade that has resulted from the present break-
down of the international gold standard.
The establishment of the gold standard as
already stated was made possible by the new dis-
coveries of gold that made this metal suffi-
ciently abundant to maintain currency systems
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of the world. The various countries employed
different methods of maintaining their curren-
cies under the gold standard but from 1850 to
1910 there appears to have been a definite re-
lation between the relative supply of monetary
gold and the world price level as shown by the
following chart.*
B
%
100
Ge.Vie»-a) Price. i_£Ve)
1 \ \ -
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This indicates that the influence of gold
supply on prices was direct and this can be at-
tributed to the fact that the gold standard and
money systems were simpler in operation than
now. Gold as it entered the currency systems of
the various countries was allowed to exert its
influence on money and credit. However, during
-^Report of the Gold Delegation of the League of
Nations, Page 31
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this period was laid the foundation for a gold
standard to follow that would be a "managed"
system, with gold being manipulated so as to
prevent it from exerting its full effect. With
increased economic activity came a more in-
volved banking system, the use of credit in-
struments, foreign exchange and clearing facil-
ities.*
The outstanding characteristics of the pre-
war gold standard were the redemption of all
bank notes in gold, the free and unlimited coin-
age of gold at a fixed price and the sole legal
tender status of gold standard currency. The
gold standard of this period also maintained a
stability that it has since been unable to at-
tain. The characteristics as outlined above are
actually fundamental economic laws of gold stand-
ard procedure that have not been adhered to in
recent gold standard practice. Has the violation
of these laws been a cause of the failure of the
system to function in late years or are a new set
of lav/s being evolved to meet the demands of the
*Based partly on Paragraph 106 of the Report of
the Gold Delegation of the League of Nations.
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intricate financial system we have estab-
lished? These possibilities are discussed
in Chapter XII.
Chapter VI
WORLD WAR INFLUENCE
The period just prior to the World War
witnessed an intense competition for control
of the available supplies of gold, chiefly
among the nations of Western Europe who must
have known that war was imminent. This caused
gold to be relatively scarce and acted as a
depressant on prices.
At the outbreak of the War the United
States was called upon for large payments of
gold as the warring nations needing it to
carry on ^demanded gold for all balances held
in this country. Ordinarily these maturing
obligations would have been cared for by an
advance of credits, probably in London. The
War made this impossible and it was necessary
to pool gold resources in this country in
order to effect payments which were made
through Ottawa instead of shipping the specie
to London, owing to the uncertainty and haz-
ards of transatlantic shipping.
*
*Chase Economic Bulletin - The Gold Standard &
the American Gold Tradition, Page 8

As the War continued, the warring nations
rapidly exhausted their gold resources in pay-
ment of supplies and materials. This necessi-
tated abandonment of the gold standard in the
nations affected and when payment in specie
was no longer possible, these nations found
that they were dependent on credit advanced by
neutral nations, but chiefly by the United
States. At the period just prior to the entry
of the United States into the War, not only
the specie but the credit of the Allies was
nearly exhausted. The first service rendered
by the United States was the advancement of
credit, mostly in the form of balances set up
in our banks upon which the Allies could draw.
These loans were intergovernmental and by the
end of the War period amounted to seven bil-
lions of dollars. After the armistice the
United States advanced additional credits of
three billions of dollars making a total debt
due to the Government of the United States of
almost ten and one half billions of dollars.
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It is this tremendous burden of debt that
has produced such a terrific strain both on in-
ternational relations and international exchange
in the past decade. The chief difficulty in the
whole problem of the war debts as it relates to
international exchange is, that this debt con-
sisted mostly of credits made available in this
country that were used to purchase supplies not
only in the United States but elsewhere. In
this way the result of this loan was the receipt
by the debtors of goods and supplies rather than
S] ecie, whereas payment at the present time has
to be made largely in specie owing to the high
tariff wall built about the United States. We
are a creditor nation on a large scale and full
payment of these debts can never be made in spe-
cie. It is essential that provision be made for
payment in goods or we must abandon hope of col-
lection.
As previously stated the warring nations of
Central and Western Europe were forced to abandon
the gold standard in an effort to preserve their

gold stocks. This meant that these countries
were on an inconvertible paper standard. Al-
though large quantities of paper money were is-
sued and prices rose sharply, there was no
breakdown in the internal finances of the vari-
ous nations, due largely to the fact that the
people were fired with a patriotic fervor and
were willing to accept paper money as a medium
of exchange with but little question.
This habit of using and accepting paper
money became so commonplace in the minds of
the people, that its continued use after the
ffar caused no lack of confidence. Gold con-
tinued as the standard of international value
but currency was irredeemable. This condition
might have continued indefinitely, but owing
to the strain on governmental finance due to
large war incurred indebtedness, the temptation
came to the Central European nations to inflate
their currencies as a means of paying their in-
ternal debt. This inflation came in the period
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from 1921 to 1925. In Germany it continued un-
til the currency was worthless and it became
imperative to have a sound currency to replace
the old.
France and Italy both tried inflation as a
means of relieving internal debt, and both were
forced to return their currencies to the gold
standard although stabilized at a new low level
more nearly in line with their national resources.
England did not indulge in inflation but, never-
theless, found it advantageous to return to gold
and chose the difficult path of deflation, peg-
ging the pound sterling to gold at the pre-war
level.
During the period of the War, the nations
pegged their foreign exchanges one in relation
to the other, which was a war-time emergency act
that could not be successfully carried out under
any other condition. This tended to stabilize
both international finance and internal price
levels
.

Chapter VII
THE POST-WAR DILEMMA
The World War has left us a most varied her
itage, of which but little is good and much is
bad. Of the bad, the worst heritage from an eco
nomic viewpoint is the saddle of international
debts and reparations which have thrown an un-
natural strain on the nations individually and
on international exchange in general. Those na-
tions that emerged from the conflict as debtor
nations have been forced to tax their people to
raise funds for payment of their external debts,
and then international exchange has had to bear
the burden of making transfer of the payment
possible either in goods or bullion.
The problem of internal taxation brought on
by these conditions resulted in unbalanced budg-
ets of the national governments until the course
of least resistance was to inflate the currency.
This tendency to inflate was further encouraged
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by the general lowering of the price levels which
set in about 1920. As the level of prices became
lower, the burden of debts became greater. Most
of the nations of Western Europe with the notable
exception of England, rapidly inflated their cur-
rencies, Germany whose burden was the heaviest
went so far as to depreciate the mark to the
point where it became worthless. This action
meant repudiation of all debts except those pay-
able in gold. A new gold mark was then created
at a ratio to the old currency of a trillion to
one. Any medium of exchange, other than one
based on tangible wealth, would have been unac-
ceptable to a public whose faith in irredeemable
money had been shattered. The French franc did
not sink to the levels of the German mark but it
did drop to about 20% of its pre-war purchasing
power and was finally stabilized in 1926 at a
gold value of $.0392.
These countries found that as a result of
inflation, they were forced to return to a sound
money basis to get their economic systems in work-
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ing order again. This period of inflation in
Europe has resulted in the impoverishment of
the middle class "while the working class as a
whole has somewhat bettered its position, wages
remaining more fixed than was the case. prior to
the War and many social benefits being available
through government patronage that were previous-
ly unknown.
One outstanding characteristic of the post-
war period has been an intensive nationalism,
perhaps on a greater scale than the world has
ever before witnessed. Each nation has desired
to become a complete and self-sufficient econom-
ic unit. Countries naturally inclined to agri-
culture have fostered industrial development in
every way possible but principally by means of
protective tariffs which have brought the lead-
ing countries of the world into a great scramble
for markets. This has tended to hamper interna-
tional trade. This nationalism has also mani-
fested itself in a desire on the part of most
countries to hoard their gold or to conserve it
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within their own borders. There have been un-
precedented attempts to control the flow of
this metal by means of tariffs, embargoes, and
other restrictions. These tariffs and restric-
tions have tended to bring a flow of gold to
the creditor nations, for the free flow of goods
to these creditor nations in payment of debts
owed to them was not possible for the reasons
just mentioned. Consequently we have witnessed
an unprecedented transfer of gold to the credi-
tor group, principally to the United States and
France, but in a lesser degree the same is true
of Holland, Belgium, Poland and Switzerland.
(England will be treated later.) The United
States was the largest creditor and received
the largest amounts of gold. A workable balance
of international payments was possible as long
as we made capital loans abroad to compensate
for gold balances being transferred here. It is
a fundamental economic law that all debts must
ultimately be paid for in goods, services or
money (gold), but a country that is such a large
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creditor as the United States will never be
able to demand payment in specie without throw-
ing international finance into chaos. This
country must accept payment in goods or resign
itself to the fact that these debts are largely
uncollectible
.
As the nations have made every effort pos-
sible to industrialize, they have unwittingly
become increasingly interdependent upon each
other for raw materials, markets and stability
of exchange. This new era of industrialism
needs as its very basis stabilized currencies.
There must be a medium of exchange which can be
depended on to have a relatively stable value
or there can be no confidence in future planning
which is essential for progress and growth.
In the same way that a currency within a
nation must have stability, so it is essential
to international trade that foreign exchange have
stability. The most successful way that the world
has yet found rests in the gold standard, and so
about 1925 the countries of Europe struggled back
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onto the gold standard. Under these conditions,
international trade flourished and there was a
tremendous increase in the wealth of nations.
Trouble, however, was brewing due to the fact
that although the various nations of the world
were back on gold, they were not permitting the
standard to work unhampered. The countries to
whom gold flowed tended to » sterilize TT a part
or the whole of what they received so that its
effect would not make itself felt on the inter-
nal price level, which is the automatic check
that made the gold standard work so happily dur-
ing the period prior to the World War. The au-
tomatic adjustments that were characteristic of
the gold standard have been missing and When the
cumulative effect of the "sterilization" was
felt, international trade was seriously hampered.
This has certainly been one of the major problems
of the present depression.
The creditor nations have attempted to avoid
the effect of accumulating gold within their bor-
ders but in the end this has brought about a mal-

distribution of gold so that the United States
and France hold a very large part of the world's
gold supply. Gold has become internationally
scarce, therefore high, and prices have converse-
ly been depressed. World trade has been stag-
nated and most countries have been driven from
the gold standard. International debts have be-
come almost uncollectible due to scarcity of bul-
lion available to debtors and high tariffs sur-
rounding the creditor nations.
If we could have a normal working of the
gold standard without any artificial controls,
the tremendous burden of debts as between coun-
tries would be considerably lessened, for gold
would tend to flowr to the countries that were
in a creditor position. This would raise their
price level and tend to bring about an outflow
of gold. Conversely, the debtor country would
find itself with a depressed price level which
would attract gold and in turn tend to raise
prices again. For this reason it seems that the so
lution to the problem of stagnation in internation

al trade is a free and unhampered gold standard
plus freedom from high tariffs and other trade
restrictions.

Chapter VIII
DIFFICULTIES OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
The distinctive characteristic of the
Federal Reserve Act passed in 1913 was the re-
gional plan which provided that the country
was to be divided into not less than eight and
not more than twelve districts, each to have a
"regional" bank. These banks are in contrast
to central banks of other countries where one
acts for the entire country. A single central
bank would not have been feasible in the United
States owing to the large area and the diversi-
fied interests of the various sections of the
country. Another reason for creating regional
banks was to decentralize financial control.
These district or regional banks are sub-
scribed to by member banks including all nation-
al banks and those state institutions that are
eligible and so inclined. They are bankers'
banks and only deal directly .ith the public in
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their open-market operations. The central au-
thority for these banks is vested with the Fed-
eral Reserve Board whose function "is not to
operate but rather to supervise and coordins.te
the system."*- This Board consists of eight men
as follows: the Secretary of the Treasury .ho
is Chairman of the Board, the Comptroller of the
Currency and six members who are appointed by
the President for a term of ten years.
The general powers of the board are given
by Edward's as follows :#
A. Confirmation of changes in rediscount rates
ai recommended by the various Federal Re-
serve banks.
B. Operation of the Gold Settlement Fund.
C. Right to suspend or remove any officer or
director of a Federal Reserve bank.
D. Granting of special privileges to member
banks
.
E. Recommendations to Congress for any changes
in the Act.
F. Publication of the monthly Federal Reserve
Bulletin.
"-Principles of Banking & Finance, Page 278, G W Edwards
# it it it it it it 278 f "
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The most important of its powers is the
right to approve,, change or reject rediscount
rates as initiated or proposed by any of the
regional banks.
The regional banks have it in their power
to redisco"unt commercial paper of the member
banks and in return, the member banks receive
currency or an increase in their deposit at the
Federal Reserve bank with whom they are doing
business. This commercial paper must meet cer-
tain definite requirements as determined by the
Federal Reserve Board, the chief of which is that
it must represent a non-speculative transaction
and must mature within ninety days of the redis-
count date. This rediscount then allows an ex-
pansion and contraction of currency to meet the
legitimate demands of business. However, there
have been factors at work during the past decade
to weaken this automatic adjustment of the na-
tion's currency, the most important being the in-
crease in the issuance of gold certificates in
the place of Federal Reserve notes. This change
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has been brought about by the tremendous flow
of gold to this country most of which has come
into the vaults of the Federal Reserve banks,
making it easy for them to issue gold certifi-
cates. This has been a potential danger as
these certificates must be backed 100% by gold
and are, therefore, wholly inelastic in compari-
son with the Federal Reserve notes. The extent
to which this was taking place can be seen from
the table on the following page. The danger
first became real in 1951 when public confidence
in our banks was weakened, due to the failure of
many. During the year 1951, 2,298 banks sus-
pended business involving deposits of approxi-
mately v 1,692, 000, 000.*
This condition brought about a reversal of
the Federal Reserve policy of issuing gold certi-
ficates, for the amount of these certificates in
circulation declined &320,000,000# in the year
ending August 51, 1952, and in the same period
Federal Reserve notes increased £845,000,000.
---Principles of Money & Banking, Page 464, R D Kilborne
^National City Bank of New York Letter for October
1952, Page 151
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The strain to which our monetary system was
being subjected owing to the loss of public con-
fidence in our banks was further increased by
the hoarding of currency and large foreign with-
drawals of gold. In February 1952 the passage
of emergency legislation in the form of the Glass
Steagall Bill was necessary to save our banking
system from collapse. This bill allowed groups
of five member banks to borrow on a promissory
note, the proceeds to be loaned to any bank in
need of assistance within the borrowing group,
provision was made for direct loans to a member
bank but at a premium on the cost of rediscount-
ing . It also provided that the collateral be-
hind the Federal Reserve notes could include di-
rect Government obligations in addition to gold
and eligible paper.
The control of rediscount rates gives to the
Federal Reserve banks a most important power in
determining our national fiscal policies. The
changes in these rates can be made to follow a
natural course, merely reflecting scarcity or a-
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bundance of credit, or on the other hand they can
be arbitrarily controlled to check expansion or
to encourage the use of credit during times of de-
pression. Other factors may motivate a change as
when in 1925 the Federal Reserve made available
to the Bank of England £200,000,000 in credit at
New York to enable England to return to the gold
standard. In order to discourage the flow of gold
to this country a policy of sheaf money by means
of low discount rates was deliberately pursued.
This set in motion expansion and inflation
tha'u later became unmanageable as reflected in the
tremendous speculative increase in the price of
securities up to 1929.
The discounting of commercial paper is a
passive act on the part of the Reserve banks for
no effort is made to buy up eligible paper. Con-
trol is exercised by means of encouraging or dis-
couraging the use of the rediscount facilities
through changes in the rediscount rate.
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There is another powerful factor in aiding
the Federal Reserve banks to pursue a definite
fiscal policy when they wish to arbitrarily in-
fluence credit. This takes the form of so-
called open-market operations. The purpose of
these operations, however, is not solely to
augment the use of rediscount rate changes and
to influence credit, but to invest the surplus
funds of the regional banks so that they can
be operated profitably. The banks are permitted
to buy and sell at will certain types of invest-
ments as listed.-*
1. Agricultural credit obligations
2. Municipal warrants
3. Trade acceptances
4. Bankers* bills
5. United States Government securities.
The relative importance of these investments
is indicated by the table given below:#
-^principles of Banking & Finance, Page 308, G W Edwards
# ! n it n n m 310, n
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS —HOLDINGS OF SECUR-
ITIES PURCHASED IN THE OPEN MARKET, 1921-1950
(in thousand dollars)
End
of
Dec
.
.Agricul- . Munici- .
.tural Cred pal War-,
.it Obliga. rants •
.tions-*
Trade
Accept-
ances
.
Bankers
'
.
Accept-
• ances
. U S
.
Gov
. Obliga-
.
tions
1921 £ ! es79 ! c 218 ! 6145,045
•
.£233,528
1922 39
. 1,178 . 270,944 . 456,155
1923 51
. 2,663 . £51,974 . 15c, 566
1924 2,050# 227 . 366,873 . 540,160
1925 5,205# 1,217 . 373,139 . 574,568
1926 2,500 . 121 . 1,258 . 379,72 8 • 614 , 820
1927 760 . 120 . 702 . 391,537 . 616,516
1928 9,825 . 60 . 537 . 488,532 . 228.064
1929 12,150 . 150 . . 392,209 . 510,587
1930 I 6,500 . 843 . . 363,844 . 729,467
-"-Includes Federal Intermediate Credit bank debentures &
Federal Land bank bonds.
vfRepresents municipal warrants and Federal Intermediate
Credit bank debentures.
This chart not only shows that the bulk of
these holdings consist of bankers T acceptances and
United States Government obligations, but also
shows that there was a tremendous increase in hold-
ings of Government obligations in 1930. This can
probably be attributed to two factors; first the
lessening of commercial paper being presented for
rediscount ,owing to the falling off in business
activity which placed a surplus of funds at the
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disposal of the Reserve banks for investment;
and secondly, to the desire to bolster credit
by means of open-market purchases.
In the early years of their existence the
Federal Reserve banks indulged extensively in
oven-market operations. "In 1915, 48% and in
1916, 72% of the total investments of the Fed-
eral Reserve banks were secured through open-
market operations . In 1917 and 1918 the pur-
chases of paper in the open-market represented
12% and 16% of the total investment operations
of the regional banks. From 1917 until about
1922, the demand of member banks for credit vras
so great that the regional banks were able to
employ all their funds in rediscount operations.
Since 1923, the open-market operations have been
confined largely to the purchase of United States
bonds and securities
.
B*
Open-market operations have been resorted to
extensively and frequently during the past three
years to bolster credit and put money in circula-
r-Principles of Money & Banking, Page 462, R D Kilborne

tion. Government bonds have been purchased in
the open market and currency has been put into
circulation thereby, but this has done little
to alleviate poor business because powerful
factors of adjustment are at work that can not
be denied and this currency has found its way
back to the banks or has remained in hoarding.
However, under "normal" conditions the open-
market operations have been effective both as
a means of investing surplus funds and control-
ling credit.
The Federal Reserve Banking System has
proven itself capable of exercising a tremen-
dous influence over credit and currency. In
spite of the temporary break-down of our bank-
ing system, the Federal Reserve banks should be
more powerful in future control of monetary pol-
icies. The experience gained from the great
strain through which they passed in March 1955,
should be invaluable as an aid to future opera-
tion. One result of the acute crisis was to
bring agitation for a unified commercial banking
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system in this country. Within a few years it
seems probable th -,t all commercial banks will
be compelled to affiliate with the Federal Re-
serve System.
The present trend in currency issue is to-
wards central bank control. In soma countries,
as in Austria, the central bank has the sole
right of issue, v/hile in the United States and
other countries the right of issue is extended
to other banks. There is strong sentiment at
the present time for revocation of currency is-
sue rights to all but the Federal Reserve banks.
This would tend to centralize control of curren-
cy and should make the management of our national
financial system more effective.

74
Chapter IX
CONTROL OF CURRENCY
and
PRICE STABILIZATION PLANS
(A) Theories of J M Keynes
This brilliant English economist has written
at great length on the subject of currency manage-
ment. It is his contention that whether we like
it or not, we have managed currency with us at
present, even in countries that are tied up with
the gold standard. This management or control is
brought about by central banking policies in re-
gard to paper currency and bank credit. He states,
"The value of gold itself depends on the policy of
the central banks."-"- Gold is sterilized arbitrari-
ly by the central b .nks and they are able to con-
trol gold exports in the form of capital loans to
other countries so that he believes that gold has
lost its power of automatic adjustment of prices
as between countries on the gold standard. How-
ever, in the present stage of world progress we
^Monetary reform, Page 183, J M Keynes
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are safer with the gold standard plus management,
than with management without the gold standard.
He recognizes that in theory we would be better
off with proper management than with gold, and
evidently" believes that this is not unattainable
for he states, "Regulation of standard of value
is not essentially more difficult than many other
objects of less social necessity which we attain
successfully This argument is, however, not
wholly logical for there is no agreement in the
minds of the thinkers as to what constitutes
proper regulation of currency. His theory, al-
though not stated so exactly, seems to be that
we are passing through a period of evolution in
currencies, from a purely gold standard to a
managed gold standard and eventually to a purely
managed standard.
The United States Federal Reserve system con-
stitutes in his opinion a managed system. Gold is
sterilized at will and credit is strictly contol-
led as a matter of policy in regulating prices and
business
.
^Monetary Peform, Page 183, J M Keynes
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In 1924 he brought forth the theory that
central banks should aim to stabilize the com-
modity value of currency rather than its gold
value and to effect the former by varying the
gold value of the unit of currency. He further
theorizes that the United States and Great
Britain thus established could be the basis of
a gold exchange standard for the rest of the
world,* History has shown that for the five
years following, the gold exchange standard was
in very wide use and was based largely on the
currencies of the United States and Great
Britain, although these two nations did not vary
the gold value of their currencies. This stand-
ard was entirely satisfactory and highly effi-
cient as regards gold, until the break in world
prices and loss of confidence in national curren-
cies. This brought not only the breaking up of
the gold exchange standard but the gold standard
itself, for the gold supplies of the United States
and Great Britain were subject to tremendous drain
and to a point ./here Great Britain was forced to
abandon the gold standard and the United States
was barely able to maintain it.
^Monetary Reform, Page 220, J M Keynes
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(B) Recent British Monetary Experience
Great Britain T s present financial ills are
largely traceable to 19<i5 when she returned, to
the gold standard at the old par which was to
bring severe deflation and strain on the balance
of payments. This step meant that they paid all
of their debts in full at the sacrifice of their
own people, particularly the working or debtor
group. To ease the strain on the balance of pay-
ments, it was necessary either to lower money in-
comes, increase efficiency or do both. The low-
ering of money income was a difficult task owing
to social benefits paid for by producers in the
-form of unemployment insurance. The effects of
deflation were partially overcome but the bad ef-
fects were cumulative and combined with the cheap
money policy pursued when pound sterling was not
in a strong position, brought an ultimate collapse
of the gold standard in 1981.
T. E. Gregory gives the following as reasons
for aggravation of Great Britain's difficulties;*
*Gold Standard & Its Future, Chap. Til, T E Gregory
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1. Stabilization of Belgian, French and Polish
currencies at low levels.
2. Japanese competition in the Far East.
3. India boycott.
4. Stagnation in demand for textiles and coal.
5. Large foreign balances in Lond (potential
danger)
.
He gives as the immediate cause of going off the
gold standard an international banking panic in-
duced partly by the Continental situation and
partly by fear that it would react dangerously
on the safety of the London banks.
He suggests that it would have been better
to have pursued a policy of 'dear* money even at
a sacrifice of part of the gold stock and to have
suppressed publicity as to the future of sterling.
Prices in Great Britain since 1931 have ris-
en to some extent which combined with the fall in
gold prices elsewhere has made Great Britain's
position more difficult. Payment of her external
debts is more costly and the acquisition of new
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gold expensive. But she has shown tremendous re-
cuperative powers and has been steadily acquiring
fresh gold. Part of this she has been able to
gather because of the tremendous size of British
investments abroad with interest regularly due.
She has added a tariff on imports that has also
helped her international position but possibly
at the expense of her populace, forcing them to a
lower standard of living.
A surprise source of gold has been India
which has sold tremendous quantities to England
because of the premium offered for it. The gold
of Inuia has an effect similar to an increase in
the world f s monetary gold supply for it had pre-
viously been hoarded and was an unknown quantity.
England's position as a creditor nation is
certain to eventually bring about an accumulation
of foreign balances. This will be particularly
true when war debt payments are scaled down or
cancelled. In this event an investment of her
surplus will be essential and in order to lend
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profitably", there must be borrowers who are
seeking loans. Other things being equal a
borrower will seek his loan in a currency that
is stable so that the value of the loan at matu-
rity can be definitely established at the time
of borrowing. Under these conditions it is
plainly evident that should the United States
agree to lower war debt payments, an early re-
turn of Great Britain to the gold standard
would be certain. London has long been an in-
ternational financial centre and has enjoyed
tremendous prestige as a result. To retain
this business with its lucrative income, it is
going to be necessary to return sterling to a
fixed ratio with gold. The sterling bloc about
which so much has been written has not material-
ized and it is doubtful that it will.
In England the banking system is highly uni-
fied and after departure from the gold standard
in 1951, there was uniform action on the part of
the banks to maintain a relatively stable price
level which they have been successful in doing.

81
There has been no inflation of currency. One
surprising feature of the trend of the internal
price level has been its similarity to gold, price
levels in the United States and. to a lesser ex-
tent to those of France.--- Can this be attributed
to the influence of sterling on gold prices or
gold on sterling prices? It probably is the lat-
ter owing to the fact that gold is still the in-
ternational measuring stick of value and that
the world is undergoing a general lowering of the
price level. "The London Economist price index
based on 1927 as 100, shows the figure 60.4. for
September 18, 1931, just before the suspension,
and 60 for November 2 9 1932. "# Another factor is
the Exchange Equalization Fund which has been
used to maintain sterling in a relatively stable
ratio to gold standard currencies. For this
purpose Parliament made available to the British
Treasury a fund of 150,000,000 pounds. The course
of sterling exchange ,f ho.s been marked by some ec-
centric movements v/hich has indicated that it was
now under control and then left to itself. "|?
-"-Boston Transcript 1/28/33, World's Central Banks
Could Raise Price Level, F J Mahaney
^National City Bank of N Y Monthly Letter,Dec 1932
Page 187
^National City Bank of N Y Monthly Letter, Dec 1932
Page 188
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This is an expensive plan for the fund must oc-
casionally be renewed but it can be considered
as a necessary evil for a paper standard country.
If gold prices could be raised, it would be
a tremendous aid in restoring an international
gold standard, for it would make it much easier
for paper standard countries to return to the
gold standard.
Great Britain has not obtained many of the
benefits that were claimed for her at the time
of leaving the gold standard, for her internal
business has but slightly improved and exports
have not boomed as it was predicted. Part of
this is due to non-flexible cost within Great
Britain which makes wages and other charges dif-
ficult to lower.
The countries that are off the gold stand-
ard such as England, buy gold as a means of
stabilizing their foreign exchange which is an
indicator of the degree to which they are de-
pendent on gold. An Associated Press dispatch*
from London on February 25, 1955, tells of
-"-The Boston Transcript, Feb 25,1953

Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, explaining recent gold purchases by
the Bank of England as being necessary to guard
against wide fluctuations in sterling exchange.
Here is shown their dependence on gold to aid
in maintaining equilibrium of their exchange.
It is certain that when the debt burden is
eased, gold prices are raised, or other favor-
able factors are present, Great Britain will
return to the gold standard but probably at a
level of about £3.45 for pound sterling.

(C) Theories of Gustave Cassel
It is Professor Gustave Cassel »s (Univer-
sity of Stockholm) belief that it may be impos-
sible to restore the gold standard as an inter-
national standard, and that it ttottld not be at
all desireable unless we reverted to what he
calls the "rules of the game". He believes that
gold is no longer an "acceptable standard of val-
ue for an international system of money."-- Its
restoration would entail "a great reduction in
the value of gold, a radical redistribution of
the world *s gold reserves, the resumption of a
systematic gold economising policy, cancellation
of all claims on reparation and war debt payments
definite guarantees against the repetition of
such extraordinary demands for gold as have oc-
curred during the last few years, and, finally,
restoration of a reasonable freedom of interna-
tional trade and of international capital move-
ments.'^
He believes that the countries now off the
gold standard should work together to set up a
-"-Report of the Gold Delegation of the League of
Nations Memorandum of Dissent, Page 74
^Report of the Gold Delegation of the League of
Nations Memorandum of Dissent, Page 75
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standard based on sterling so that some degree
of stability can be maintained. From this ex-
perience he intimates that an acceptable stand-
ard may be evolved. These plans which he brought
forth a year ago for the formation of a "sterling
group" have been widely advocated since that time,
and some progress has been made particularly as
regards the relation of the Scandinavian curren-
cies to sterling, and it is being urged that all
the countries of the Empire join this group. Only
recently several of the Empire countries abandon-
ed gold, South Africa being the most recent, and
these countries are stabilizing their exchange
with sterling
. The only notable exception is Cana-
da and the action of the Canadian dollar on the for-
eign exchanges would indicate that it is generally
believed that Canada will abandon the gold standard
and join the sterling group. Opposed to this be-
lief, however, is the strong financial tie between
New York and Canada.
Last year in a series of Rhodes Memorial Lec-
tures delivered at Oxford, Professor Cassel was very
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outspoken against gold reserves being tied up in
a definite ratio to note circulation. He stated
that the countries on the gold standard should in-
flate their currencies. He explained that the
United States and France had sterilized their sur-
plus gold.
The opinions of Professor Cassel seem to be
tinged with pro-British sentiments for the stipu-
lations that he makes for a return to gold are es-
sentially those that would be beneficial to Eng-
land. Sweden since leaving the gold standard in
September 1951 has been successful in maintaining
a stable internal price structure.-"- This is a
small homogeneous nation which enjoys the able
economic leadership of such men as Professor Cas-
sel. Their financial system is closely linked
with that of Great Britain. Their gold holdings
have been small amounting to only $-64,000,000 in
June 1931 at which time they possessed $76,000,000
in foreign exchange# mostly in sterling.
*Money & Prices & the Depression, W G Sutcliffe
#National City Bank of N Y Monthly Letter, Oct 1951
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(D) Theories of E. E. Garrison
Elisha E. Garrison has written an extremely
interesting volume entitled The Riddle of Econom-
ics and published in 1932. He deals at consider-
able length with the theory of money and princi-
pally with regard to its scientific issue.
He assumes a minimum average requirement for
money volume and then theorizes as to what should
govern the volume of money over and above these
minimum requirements. This flexible portion of the
money volume he refers to as marginal money. The
control of the volume he believes should be in the
hands of the central bank who would rediscount
short-term commercial paper based on non-speculative
exchanges of useful commodities, and the rediscount
privilege should be limited to this type of paper
exclusively.
This plan as he outlines it would eliminate
support of speculation by the central bank. He does,
hov/ever, point out that the tremendous increase in
the use of the bank check makes it difficult to con-
trol speculation.
"Gold", as he sees it, "is only one of the many
elements in price determination.
. . .
banking
* The Piddle of Economics by E. F. Garrison Page 95
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methods employed are vastly more influential,....
issue banks
. .
.shall adopt the principle of bas-
ing the circulating medium upon a combination of
public and private credit.
. .
.using a large pro-
portion of the world T s gold as a reserve rather in
the military sense than in the money sense, as a
means of strengthening the public credit of each
nation with its own people, as well as with other
nations
.
Garrison»s plan for restriction of rediscount
to non-speculative paper is sound but too limited
to permit development and expansion of new indus-
tries. Recent experience in the United States has
shown that the basis for currency issue should not
be too restricted so that currency can be used in
times of financial stress to replace shrinking bank
deposits
.
* The Riddle of Economics by E. F. Garrison Page 4g

(E) Price Theories of Richard Whitney
Richard Whitney, President of the New York
Stock Exchange, delivered an address before the
Merchants 1 Association of New York on September
17, 1931, which has since been printed in pam-
phlet form under the title of Economic Law in
Business. He discusses in a most able manner
the theory of prices and their relation to busi-
ness and finance. The speech traces our recent
business and financial history from the time of
the World War. He relates that there was strong
sentiment to stabilize prosperous conditions
that set in about 1925. Quoting his article,
"Both government and private interests proceeded
to peg or manipulate prices on the blithe assump-
tion that they were thereby introducing ' order'
into business by 'leveling off the hills and the
valleys' of price fluctuations. They forgot
that in most commodities the basic conditions of
supply and demand were constantly changing, and
that prices had of necessity to change with them.
He treats of the attempt of Brazil to fix
the price of coffee, Great Britain that of rubber
^Economic Law in Business, Page 9, R Whitney

Canada wheat and of the Continental cartels in
steel, iron and other products. In addition
there were attempts by the "United States Govern-
ment to stabilize prices of wheat, cotton and
other agricultural products.
Production, as he states, was unnaturally
stimulated and the lav; of supply and demand was
disregarded. "In the end, the over-stimulated
production over ./helmed the world *s markets and
precipitated a violent readjustment in commodi-
ty prices which has borne world-wide depression
in its wake. Tr#
The same is true only on a larger scale of
attempts to staoilize the general price level.
Prices are looked upon as the cause of much of
our grief as they always decline severely dur-
ing a period of readjustment and are associated
with the evils of the times, whereas they are
merely an indicator that powerful factors are
at work to correct our economic system. If
stability of currency/ could be obtained (not
stability of prices), then the governing factor
-^Economic Law in Business, Page 9, R D Whitney
# " « « n « 10, 9

of prices would be the law of supply and demand.
If prices were allowed to seek their own level
without such interferences as tariffs and at-
tempts at price stabilization, they would act
as an economic balance. Price stabilization
in general acts as an offset to the lav/ of sup-
ply and demand. In that way it brings about
overproduction and overextension of capital
equipment. The theory of attaining price sta-
bilization is based on the premise that sta-
bilization of prices is desireabie. Would it
not be more logical to work for a sound money
system with expansion and contraction of the na-
tion's currency as it was needed? Interest and
discount rates should not be so controlled by
central banks that they tend to offset price
movements in either direction, but should resume
their original function of reflecting scarcity or
plentiiulness of credit and allow the law of sup-
ply and demand to take its normal course. We
have governmental control and interference in busi
ness, agriculture and banking at the demand of

organized minorities. Finance as well as busi-
ness would be healthier with less of such inter-
ference and paternalism. The government should
confine itself to guaranteeing the security of
money. One of the chief virtues of gold as a
backing for currency is the elimination of the
necessity for too much governmental regulation.

(F) Theories of Irving Fisher
Professor Fisher is an advocate of the plan
for a stabilized dollar. He would accomplish
this by means of a gold dollar of varying weight
and fixed purchasing power. The present gold
value of the American dollar is 23.82 grains of
pure gold. Under Fisher T s plan this weight of
gold would be varied with the rise and fall in
prices. He would set up a commodity price index
based on one hundred essential items of trade.
As this index rose he would raise the weight of
the gold dollar to offset the rise in commodity
prices and conversely he would lower the weight
of the gold dollar to offset a lowering of his
price index. This adjustment would be monthly
and would be limited to a change of 1% per month.
Assuming that a representative commodity
price index could be compiled, it is doubtful
that variations in the gold content of the dollar
would be entirely effective in stabilizing prices
for there are many factors of credit, currency
turn over and supply of goods that must be consid

ered. The operation of this plan would bring
undesireable fluctuations in foreign exchange
rates which would seriously affect our foreign
trade
.
The stabilized dollar would undoubtedly
bring a degree of internal price stabilization
but it is doubtful that the benefits so attain-
ed would be worth the sacrifices that this clan
would entail.

(G) Theories of T. E. Gregory
T. E. Gregory, a brilliant English econ-
omist, has written a volume on The Gold Stand-
ard and Its Future which gives a very complete
picture of gold standard operation.
He cites the necessity for central bank
cooperation among nations desiring to operate
under the gold standard and he advocates abol-
ishing minimum statutory reserve rates and the
lowering of the gold content of the unit of cur-
rency."- The abolishing of minimum reserve re-
quirements as he sees it, would free large
quantities of gold that are now "immobilized".
This combined with the lowering of the gold con-
tent of the unit of currency should bring about
economies in the use of gold.
He further believes that if prices in gold
standard countries were to rise, need of cooper-
ation would be lessened and the return of paper
standards to gold would be made easier.
"'The Gold Standard & Its Future, Final Chapter,
T E Gregory
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He makes some interesting observations
in regard to world chaos necessitating a re-
turn to the gold standard. "It is not in
periods of general distress that a paper cur-
rency can be successfully managed.""- This is
a refreshing view point and is in contrast to
most theorizing.
*The Gold Standard & Its Future, Page 94, T E Gregory
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Chapter X
THE WORLD'S GOLD SUPPLY
Much has been written on the adequacy or
inadequacy of the world's monetary gold supply
as well as the yearly production necessary to
support natural increase and growth of trade.
Cassel's studies are well known, and widely
quoted, particularly his theory that a yearly
increase of 2.8$* in total gold supply is neces-
sary to sustain prices and support credit if
economic progress is to be maintained at the
present pace. Kitchin has made similar studies
with the result that he figures a &,X% increase
in monetary gold supply is necessary for stabil-
ity of the general price level over any consid-
erable length of time.
The total supply of monetary gold at the
rjresent time is approximately twelve billion dol-
lars and production during the past year has been
greatly accelerated due to lower costs of produc-
tion and increased purchasing power of gold. The
-*The Functioning of the Gold Standard, Chap III,
Section 6, Dr. F . Mlynarski
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National City Bank of New York in its monthly
letter presents some interesting statistics on
gold stocks and production. Their table shows
an annual increase in gold stocks from 1900-
1929 of 5.8^ and from 19S9-1952 of 5$.* These
figures would indicate an adequate increase in
the world f s supply. Gold production for the
year 1932 at the mines was (494,000,000 which
is a new high record. The best previous year
was 1915 when $470,000,000 in gold was mined.
In addition to this £220,000,000 in gold was
released from India and China. After consider-
ing the £ 40, 000, 000 in gold absorbed for non-
monetary purposes, the net gain to the existing
monetary stock was 5.S$.#
The table on the following page shows some
interesting trends in the accumulation of gold
stocks.^
-*The National City Bank of N Y Monthly Letter
Page 42, March 1935
#The National City Bank of N Y Monthly Letter
Page 43, March 1933
liable taken from National City Bank of N Y Monthly Letter
Page 137, September 1932
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GOLD RESERVES OF CENTRAL BANKS AND GOVERNMENTS
(in millions of dollars)
1900 1913 1932
Dec 31 Dec 31 June
United States 511 1,290 5,610*
United Kingdom 139 165 663
France 451 679 3,218
Russia 365 872 349
Lrerniany ny 279 198
Italy 78 265 298
Aus tr ia-Hung ar
y
186 251 87#
Belgium 21 48 357
Netherlands 24 61 394
Switzerland 19 33 503
Sweden 10 27 55
Norway 7 12 40
Spain 68 92 455
Argentina 256 249
Japan 33 65 214
15 (17) Countries 2,031 4,395 10,670
30 Other Countries 538 776
45 (47) Countries 4,933 11,446
This table shows a large increase in gold stocks
from 1900-1913 at a time when gold production was in-
creasing yearly,but an even larger increase is sho.vn
in the period from 1913-1932 when gold production
was falling off in volume. This can be accounted
for by the tendency to hold gold coins in central
bank vaults in contrast to the pre-war period when
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary
#End of August, 1932
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gold coins circulated freely. The large gold
reserves of the United States and France are
shown in contrast to the relatively small gold
stock of the United Kingdom.
These studies may be of some theoretical
value but from a practical view point they are
overshadowed by the necessity of making avail-
able supplies of gold sufficiently elastic to
care for normal growth of trade. The gold stand-
ard is cert.?iin to be the backbone of our inter-
national financial system for several genera-
tions at least, for if a paper standard in pure
theory is admittedly superior, it should be
recognized that the change from gold to paper,
successfully managed, would be, at best a
gradual evolution.
The present supply of monetary gold is en-
tirely adequate if it is properly managed through
international cooperation. It has also been shown
that when gold through abnormal circumstances is
in great demand, much gold which previously has
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not been a part of the known monetary supply
can be attracted to monetary use, as illustrated
by the large sums of gold (estimated to be one
quarter of a billion dollars) sold to London from
India after England left the gold standard in
1931. Much gold that is now hoarded will be in
circulation as money when financial stability
is attained again.

Chapter XI
RECENT EVENTS
At the present time there are numerous re-
strictions on gold exports and in some cases
by countries that are on the gold standard.
This would certainly indicate that there has
been a breakdown in the international balance
of payments.
Business has been declining steadily since
the summer of 1989 and this recession has been
accompanied by an effort on the part of each
country to protect home industries, principally
by means of high -tariffs which preclude payment
of international debts in goods. A great strain
has thereby been thrown on the monetary gold
system of the world. To an increasing extent the
payments of international balances have had to be
made in gold. Gold has been shipped from one
country to another at a rate never before equalled
in history. As credits and loans were no longer
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available to the debtor nations, doubt as to
their ability to meet obligations was prevalent.
It was this condition that led to the Austrian
banking crisis in 1931 which was to spread ra-
pidly from one financial centre of Europe to an-
other. The immediate result of this was the
abandonment of the gold standard by Great Brit-
ain, followed by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ireland,
Japan and other. A further result was an embargo
on gold exports by almost all countries of the
world except the United States and France. (The
U.S. has since placed an embargo on gold.) Tech-
nically and from a world view point these countries
have abandoned the gold standard. As a result of
the European crises, the gold reserves of the United
States were subject to large foreign withdrawals.
Almost a year later, in the summer of 1932, the
United States suffered another severe gold drain-
age but was able to meet all demands. This drain-
age of gold was largely the result of transfer-
ring foreign balances from New York to "aris. At
this time a technical weakness appeared in the

gold standard system of this country which was
temporarily (for a period of one year) remedied
by emergency legislation known as the Glass
Steagall Bill. The Federal Reserve System of
issuing currency was based on the theory that
eligible paper would expand during periods of
business activity and contract during periods
of lesser activity, thereby making an ideal
partner for gold as a backing for Federal Re-
serve currency. This theory assumed that
periods of activity necessitated more curren-
cy and vice versa, but there has been a new
factor enter into the proposition in the
greatly increased use of bank checks. There
has been a trend to the use of the checking
account by the person of small and average
means while it was formerly considered as nec-
essary only for those in comfortable financial
circumstances. The direct result of this was
the lessened need for currency while business
was pursuing a normal course. W@ had a large
gold reserve and a plentiful supply of commer-
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cial paper which made it seem that our system
was extremely sound and there was no agitation
for any change. However, the present depression
has shown that our system, although sound when
inaugurated, has since become obsolete and must
be revised. As business receded after 1929,
the people of the country still enjoyed a con-
siderable degree of prosperity. While the com-
mercial paper available for rediscount was less,
there was still ample coverage for our currency
needs. Checking accounts were still active and
there was no marked increase in the volume of
currency in circulation. As the depression
deepened, many people found themselves unable
or unwilling to maintain their checking account
deposits and reverted to the use of currency for
payment of their obligations. Check transactions
steadily declined from October 1929 when they
reached a peak value of
-,.95,000,000,000 to November
193£ when they totaled s £0,000,000,000. Instead
of a lessening amount of currency being needed dur-
ing time of business inactivity, we have the phe-
nomena of a marked increase in its use and during
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a period when commercial paper available for re-
discount is rapidly contracting. Although we had
tremend us gold reserves in 1952, there was such
a shortage of commercial paper that legal back-
ing for all new Federal Reserve currency issued
required full gold coverage. Each new dollar
must be issued on the basis of 100% gold reserve.
This technical weakness became most apparent dur-
ing gold raids on New York in the spring and sum-
mer of 1932 and was partially offset by the emer-
gency legislation that has been mentioned. The
substance of this legislation was to increase
types of credit instruments (Government Bonds)
that were eligible for rediscount and currency
backing
.
In contrast to this constructive legislation
that tended to mane our system more flexible, was
the adoption of a Federal tax of 2% on bank checks
as a part of the Emergency Act. Here is the very
instrument of credit that is flexible enough to
meet all of our needs for a medium of exchange,
one that could relieve pressure on currency and

one that should be fostered. The consequence
of this tax was to increase the volume of cur-
rency needed to carry on business. It also
tended to de ress prices further through the
increased demand for currency, thereby increas-
ing its worth.
Meanwhile our banking system was being ser-
iously undermined and weakened through the dras-
tic lowering of prices. The deposits of 1980-
1929 were invested in high priced securities and
assets that have since depreciated in value. When
the financial crises of 1935 arrived, the banks
were called upon to pay depositors in dollars
that were far more valuable than those deposited.
At the same time there was a flight from the dol-
lar to gold. Gold was demanded for currency and
on March 6, 1953, a national bank holiday was de-
clared for a period of four days. The extent of
the strain to which our banking system had been
subjected may be gained from the following com-
parison. On Jan 11, 1953, the reserves of the Fed
eral Reserve Bank of New York City in excess of
legal requirements were |556, 000, 000, and on Feb-
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ruary 15, 1933, they had been reduced to $29,000,000*
which would make it seem probable that excess re-
serves of that bank were considerably below require-
ments at the time when the New York State bank holi-
day was declared on March 4, 1932. On March 1, 1953,
the Federal Reserve gold backing for currency was
about 55% and although definite information is not
available, the figures given above would indicate
that there was not sufficient eligible paper and
government bonds to make up the additional 45% of
coverage for currency in circulation which had
reached a new high level for all time at better
than seven billion dollars.
The banks need a scaling down of deposits or
an increase in the price level to reach solvency,
but what is most ama2-,ing is that a country whose
currency is at a new high level, should still have
a 50^ backing of gold and find it necessary to
abandon redemption of currency and put an embargo
on exports of gold.
^National City Bank of N Y Monthly Letter, Page 37
March 1933

Our monetary system should be so con-
stituted that gold without limit could be
used for redemption or at least the reserve
limit should be lowered and provision made
for increasing the flexibility of the eligible
paper volume so that a sufficient supply for
currency backing will always be available.
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Chapter XII
CONCLUSIONS
Gold is universally the most valuable product
known, existing in sufficient quantities for use
as a medium of exchange. Granting the truth of
the above assertion, gold is the most desireable
commodity for this use. There is only one other
alternative in creating a medium of exchange and
that is currency artificially controlled or valued
by governments.
The ideal currency would be one whose value
is entirely stable within itself so that all fluc-
tuations in rice would reflect increased or less-
ened demand for goods or services. In this sense
gold is not an ideal foundation for our currency
and vossibly govex-nmental control of currency val-
ue can be made to seem ideal, in theory at least.
One favorite argument of those favoring con-
trol of currency by artificial means is that we
should be able to give value to currency based on
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scientific principles without resorting to some
metallic substance whose value is determined by
chance and fluctuates accordingly.
They, however, presume that the human guid-
ance of "controlled" currency will be wise and
prudent. History has shown that currency can
best be issued or governed by national govern-
ments. If this is true, then we are dependent
on our national leaders for this wise and prudent
guidance. Even if it be entrusted to a central
bank, which may be privately operated, authority
thus granted to the central bank may be recalled
or revised at the wish or humor of the national
government. It means that our "controlled" cur-
rency of the future would only be as stable as
the party or group in power and nothing is any
more changeable in our dynamic world than national
governments. No stability of currency over any
period of time can be achieved by control vested
directly or indirectly in a national government.
Gold has had a relatively stable value almost

from the beginning of civilization, while
national governments have come and gone. In
an ideal state no gold would be needed to ef-
fect an exchange of goods, but ideal states
do not exist, and in the same way if we had an
ideal government, artificial control of curren-
cy would be entirely possible and assured of
successful operation.
The present breakdown of monetary systems
is not due to the inefficiency of the gold
standard but to too much interference with the
proper operation of the gold standard.
The practical solution to our monetary
difficulties lies with the gold standard and
its rjroper operation. What then constitutes
proper operation? Principally the free oper-
ation of the standard as it existed prior to
the World War ] lus a World Bank that would
act as a clearing house for international ex-
change and a depository for funds of central
banks
.
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This bank should be subscribed to by the cen-
tral banks of the world. Its relation to these
central banks would be similar co the relations
of the Federal Reserve Bank to its member banks.
This World Bank would economize the existing
gold supply, permit expansion of industrial activ-
ities and the development of backward portions of
the world, thus raising the standard of living gen-
erally. It would have the same effect as a large
increase in the world T s gold supply. Foreign ex-
change of subscribing nations would be stabilized
and transfer of specie as between countries could
be minimized. It would counteract some of the
evil effects of high tariffs on international ex-
change.
The development of the gold exchange stand-
ard was an indication of the dependence of the
weaker nations on a few strong financial centres
for monetary support. This they accomplished by
including in the reserves of their central banks
foreign exchange of countries with well-developed

financial systems whose currency was redeemable
in gold. No agreement was necessary to accom-
plish this as the foreign exchange to be used
for reserve purposes could be purchased on the
open market. This system was a constant menace
to the security of the countries whose foreign
exchange was being held as a reserve. When the
European banking crisis of 1S31 threatened the
financial security of England, there was a
flight from the pound by countries using Eng-
lish foreign exchange as a reserve. The conse-
quent drain of gold out of England was so great
that she was forced to abandon specie payments.
The World Bank should eliminate the neces-
sity for use of the gold exchange standard by
the weaker nations. It should inspire confi-
dence in periods of financial stress, and in fat
should be a stabilizing influence to minimize
periods of marked financial strain to which we
are now subjected. Being international in its
character, it should be relatively more stable
than any national institution and accordingly a

refuge for surplus gold which could be used
to aid the weak nations and thereby maintain
a balanced international monetary system. The
leveling of the gold supply should keep the
value of gold from appreciating to any marked
extent in contrast with the experience of the
past two years. This bank would be a natural
development in view of the extent to which in-
ternational trade has developed along with in-
dustrialism. Nations have become increasingly
interdependent and such a bank should be one
that would inspire confidence and be a medium
that could be used by any country without
sacrifice of national pride.
Those nations who found it necessary could
use the backing of the World Bank for their cur-
rencies. They should be required to make a nom-
inal gold deposit such as 10% of the currency to
be issued and the remaining 9Gf deposit to consi
of Government bonds. These bonds should be pay-
able in gold and amortized yearly by payment to
the bank. In return the currency of the sub-
scribing nation would be guaranteed. The agree

ant would provide for withdrawal of guarantee in
case of violation of requirements, except that ex-
tension of time should be allowed for amortization
when a nation is honestly unable to make payment.
There should also be a penalty for failure to amor-
tize bonds as they become due even when an exten-
sion is granted, so that effort will be made to
Kee.. national finances in order.
During the period 1925-1930 when the world
as a whole was enjoying unprecedented prosperity,
the gold standard was in operation in all of the
large and important countries. This is no coin-
cidence but is merely a sample of the prosperity
that is ours for the effort of reestablishing the
gold standard and in such a way that it will en-
dure
.
It has always been true in financial history
that new and large sources of gold have brought
increased industrial activity and world develop-
ment. The establishing of an international central
bank would have this effect through the efficient
use of the world's available gold supply.

Two aids to a better operation of the gold
standard for national currencies would be a com-
pulsory lowering of minimum reserve requirements
for subscribers to the international bank, or
better, redemption of currency until all gold
held as reserve has been exhausted, which should
tend to prevent runs on national currencies and
remove fear that the gold standard will be aban-
doned .<hen legal reserve percentage can not be
maintained as in the United States at present.
International cooperation to an extent that
would make this bank possible is entirely possi-
ble but there is one menace to the operation of
these plans and that is world-wide warfare. War
within narrow limits should not seriously threat-
en its existence, but if the conflict became too
wide spread, it might conceivably dissolve the
institution. However, once successfully operat-
ed, it would be the natural act of resuming peace
ful relations to reestablish this bank as soon as
possible
.
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Subscribing nations would have two courses
of action for maintaining their currencies on
the gold standard. One would be to keep an in-
dependent gold reserve upon which the national
currency could be based. This course would be
followed by the nations strong financially, and
their subscription to the World Bank would be
principally for convenience in the settlement of
international balances and as a depository for
surplus gold. The second course of action would
be for nations not able to operate an independ-
ent financial system and would include many
backward and undeveloped nations. For them this
bank would offer financial stability and a guar-
antee of currency as previously outlined in this
chapter. The natural result would be increased
economic activity that should be of great bene-
fit to all nations. New markets would be avail-
able, many new products and industries would be
developed and the conomic welfare of people gen-
erally would be considerably improved.
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The existing Bank of International Settle-
ments functions as an international bank but
within much narrower limits than those outlined
above. However, its powers could be extended to
include the fundamentals of this plan. If this
was not feasible, it would be necessary to found
an entirely new bank.
These developments im
;
ly international co-
operation during a period in world history of
intense nationalism. However, the fact that
this nationalistic attitude has been so strong
and has endured for a decade, is a good indica-
tion that sentiment may easily swing the other
way, particularly because of the severe econom-
ic depression through which we are now passing.
People have a habit of returning to fundamental
truths during periods of adversity.

SUMMARY
The first three chapters of this paper
deal with the history and theory of money,
and especially as they apply to the use of
gold and the gold standard. The evolution
of monetary systems and standards is traced
through the 19th and 20th centuries with
emphasis on the influence of the World War.
In Chapter VIII there is a discussion
of some of the difficulties of Federal Re-
serve banking operations. Chapter IX contains
a study of recent English experience with the
gold and paper standards as well as the mone-
tary theories of some of our leaders of econ-
omic thought.
Some interesting statistics on gold stocks
and distribution are contained in Charter X
which deals with the world *s gold supply.
A chapter on recent events has been added
to this paper due to the interesting monetary

developments in the United States during the
past few weeks
.
Chapter XII includes not only the conclu-
sions reached as a result of this entire study,
but a definite plan of action to remedy the
difficulties of maintaining monetary systems in
a balanced relation. It is the writer f s belief
that some plan of international cooperation for
the proper operation of an international gold
system is nearer than is gener ;J.ly believed.
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